Conventions as well as standards influence the practice of financial reporting.
Enforced Standards Versus Evolution by General
This broad movement towards reliance on institutions to write and enforce financial reporting standards has been accompanied by surprisingly little theoretical or empirical analysis of their possible merits relative to the evolutionary approach. Such analyses could be facilitated by comparing deliberately designed mechanisms or legislated standards on one hand, and evolved norms on the other. Hayek's ([1973] , Chapter 1:
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Reason and Evolution) comparison of designed and evolved mechanisms is a good example.
Some recent law and economics literature has addressed the relationship between formal regulation (by law), and various informal or social modes of regulation (e.g.
Posner [2003] ). There is an implicit assumption in this literature that eventually all markets require legal regulation to succeed (McMillan [2003] ). Recently, several attempts have been made to document the informal development of social order arising from repeated interaction and shared socialization (social capital) among individuals in a society (Coleman [1990] ; Putnam [1993] ). The literature on informal control suggests that the role of law as a source of social order has been exaggerated in the mainstream literature.
A detailed examination of a successful online auction market (eBay) by Duh, Jamal and Sunder [2002] indicates that eBay has sought to develop an effective market by relying primarily on informal controls such as personal reputation and creation of an eBay community. Rather than focusing on the punitive function of the law, recent research by Mailath et al. [2001] develops a theoretical framework for the impact of law and authority being rooted in the expectations people have about the behavior of others,
i.e., social norms. Richard Posner [1997] has proposed that the key role for the law is to formalize existing social norms and provide a credible mechanism for publicizing rule violations, and enforcement of penalties. Other legal scholars (e.g., Lessig [1998] ; Sunstein [1996] ) however, have proposed that the law should be used in a more activist manner to help shape social norms. The limited evidence available on the interplay
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While the interplay between formal standards and informal norms has always been important in financial reporting, the events of recent years have brought increased attention to this topic. Revival of the rules vs. principles debate in accounting is an example. Detailed rules are supported by an inclination to enforce them by law, while general principles require judgment in an environment that values social norms.
It is difficult to gather empirical data on this topic from the financial accounting domain, so we present a direct comparison of empirical observations from the field of ecommerce privacy, which has some significant parallels to financial reporting (see Jamal, Maier and Sunder [JMS 2003 ] for a detailed discussion of the externalities associated with privacy and financial reporting). JMS ( [2003] ) documented the ecommerce privacy standards and practices in the U.S. where little government regulation or enforcement exists; social norms are developed by civic organizations like TRUSTe that arose to develop better privacy practices, albeit under implicit threat of government legislation. The present study documents the e-commerce privacy practices and standards in the United Kingdom (U.K.) where the Information Commission, a British government agency, currently enforces the privacy law of the European Union (EU). The EU's activist stance led to early legislation to mold commercial privacy practices.
A comparison of the U.S. and the U.K. practices reveals that the frequency of junk email received by those who register at e-commerce websites in the two countries is about the same. Only a small number of websites in the two countries violate the privacy Standards The recent advent of e-commerce provides an opportunity to observe and compare privacy standards, disclosure, auditing and practices, with and without a regulatory regime in place. JMS [2003] documented the prevailing disclosure policies, the development of a market for independent web assurance services, and the privacy practices of 100 high traffic e-commerce websites in the U.S. during the second half of the year 2001. The key findings of JMS are: (1) Most e-commerce websites in the U.S.
behave responsibly, provide good disclosure, and honor opt-in or opt-out choices of consumers, and (2) A small number of e-commerce websites account for an overwhelming proportion of abuses of consumer privacy.
In the present study, we use the JMS field experiment method and design to examine the disclosure and privacy practices of 56 high traffic websites in the U.K. These sites are 1 We do not consider the security breaches which are unintentional, but have the same effect on violating the privacy of customers. For example, see Tedeschi [2003] .
2 LaPorta et al. [2003] analyzed securities regulation in 49 countries and found no evidence that public enforcement of securities laws assists the development of efficient stock markets.
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national privacy law (see Appendix A). The Information Commission (IC), monitors and enforces compliance with this law (see Appendix B for measures of compliance effort).
We examine compliance with two key aspects of the law for which JMS documented the corresponding U.S. practices: (1) The requirement to provide disclosure or notice of what consumer information is gathered and used by the website, and (2) The consent requirement that consumers be provided with an option to control how their personal information is used by a website for secondary purposes.
Our results indicate that (1) Disclosure of privacy practices in the U.K. is no better, perhaps worse, than in the U.S. It is more difficult to find the privacy policy of a U.K.
website, and compliance with the disclosure requirements of the U.K. privacy laws are condition, most of the email comes from a single website, just as in the U.S. Overall we find no important differences between the average behavior of the British and American websites in this respect. Consumers in both regimes remain vulnerable to a small number of websites who misbehave. In the U.S., better companies can signal their good intentions to their visitors by paying a small fee to purchase a web-seal from an independent provider such as TRUSTe or BBB Online. In the regulatory regime of the U.K., the Standards and Norms, 12/2/03 market for web-seals has barely developed 3 . We outline the implications of the privacy findings for financial reporting in Section 5.
Regulation of Privacy Practices in the U.S. and U.K.
The concept of privacy is deemed to be central to the development of an autonomous self, and hence an important facet of individual liberty (DeCew [1999] ). Until recently, privacy rights focused on the intimate details of one's life, such as the right to be silent about one's sexual preference, and the right to abortion. In addition, there was a general concern about providing government or other institutional authorities with too much information. There was less concern with privacy in business (DeCew [1999] ).
That began to change with the rise of drug use in the general population in the 1960's and the1970's as business firms began to test prospective, even current, employees for drug use. More recently, electronic surveillance of the behavior of employees, and employer access to employees' genetic and medical records has raised new privacy concerns relating to business (Kupfer, [1993] , Brockett and Tankersley, [1997] ).
With the Internet and the development of e-commerce, privacy issues became more complicated as a result of the new technology. New e-commerce technology has substantially increased the ability of online merchants to collect, monitor, target, profile and even sell personal information about customers to third parties (JMS [2003] ). The intrusiveness of telemarketing activity and spam has raised the profile of privacy issues involving business.
In response to broad societal concerns about privacy, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the U.S. government, and the EU began extensive discussions in the 1970s about developing a regulatory framework for privacy.
These discussions were guided by five privacy principles enumerated by the OECD [1980] : (1) Notice/Awareness: Participants should receive notice of an entity's information practices before they divulge any personal information. (2) Choice/Consent:
Participants should be given options as to the uses of any personal information collected from them, especially for secondary uses that are unrelated to complete the original transaction (e.g., sale of information to third parties). (3) Access /Participation: A participant should have access to the information recorded about him and be able to modify any information that is deemed incorrect. (4) Integrity/Security: Collectors must take reasonable steps to ensure data integrity, convert it into anonymous form before using it for secondary purposes and destroy untimely data. (5) Enforcement/Redress:
There must be a mechanism in place to enforce the privacy policies.
The EU decided to adopt a formal (legal) regulatory framework for the protection of privacy. In 1995 the EU parliament formalized the EU privacy law by passing the European Directive on Data Protection (EU Directive 95/46/EC). The Directive adopted the abovementioned five principles, and required the member countries to bring their national laws into compliance. 4 The Directive stipulated that personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully and only collected for a specified, explicit, and legitimate purpose. The use of data for any secondary purposes beyond those stated is prohibited.
Data cannot be kept any longer than needed to serve the stated purpose, and the data can only be collected if the person has given his or her consent. There is some discretion As of November 2003, in the U.S., there is virtually no government regulation of privacy, and no legal requirement to disclose privacy policies in e-commerce or on the 5 The UK law requires each entity that collects personal data to have and disclose a privacy policy. The privacy policy notice must be of sufficient size, easy to find, and sufficiently detailed so that it can be presumed that a reader has given informed consent. The Notice must be made available before personal data is first collected (Reidenberg and Schwartz [1998] 
Research Method and Results For Notice/Awareness Study
We gathered data from 56 high traffic websites in the U.K. by repeating the procedure used in the JMS [2003] 
Disclosure (Notice/Awareness) Results
The results of the disclosure of privacy policies of the 56 high traffic U.K. websites are presented in Table 1 (alongside, for ease of comparison, the results from 100 high traffic U.S. websites reported by JMS). In the U.S., JMS report that 34 websites had paid for a privacy assurance web-seal from an independent party (30 TRUSTe, 2 BBB Online, and 2 had both TRUSTe and BBB Online). None of the websites in the U.K. displayed a web-seal. One consequence of a legislated standards approach to privacy appears to be the elimination, or preclusion, of a market for private web assurance. Since the law requires a disclosure of privacy policies but not privacy audit, we observe no market for privacy assurance seals in the U.K. The privacy disclosure law appears to have eliminated the incentives for the websites to use web-seals as signals of their good privacy practices to consumers. Table 1 About Here
In the U.S., JMS reported that it was easy to locate the privacy policies of 97 percent of the websites in the sample. In most cases, it could be located from the home page. In the U.K., we found it difficult to locate privacy policies on websites. The U.K.
law requires the privacy policy to be provided before any personal data is collected. We therefore looked for the policy at the main home page, the registration page, and the page where personal information was entered. Our search succeeded in only 77 percent of the websites in our sample. This suggests low compliance with the legal requirement to provide a privacy policy, and the precedents set by the Data Protection Tribunal requiring privacy policies to be prominent, easy to read, and provided before personal information is collected. Perhaps U.S. websites view the disclosure of privacy policies as an instrument of their marketing strategy to attract consumers, and make it easy to find this policy. U.K. websites, on the other hand, appear to view privacy disclosure as a matter of a bureaucratic requirement, and make it difficult to find their statements of policy. The frequency of non-compliance raises doubts about the effectiveness of the EU law in promoting privacy policy disclosures.
In the U.S., JMS [2003] reported that all 34 of the privacy seal websites and 64 of the remaining 66 non-seal websites used cookies, for an overall 98 percent cookie usage.
The disclosure of cookie usage was also high, with all 34 privacy seal websites and 55 of the remaining 64 websites (overall 91 percent) disclosing their cookie usage. In the U.K.
the rate of cookie usage was lower, with only 88 percent (49 out of 56 websites) using cookies to monitor consumers (p<0.01). The disclosure rate of cookie usage in the U.K.
was also lower, with only 80 percent (39 out of 49) of the websites who use cookies
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In the U.S., JMS [2003] report that third parties placed cookies on visitor hard drives in 31 (91 percent) of the websites with seals, and 48 (73 percent) of the websites without a seal, for an overall third party cookie usage rate of 79 percent. Thirty websites with a seal (97 percent) disclosed the presence of these third-party cookies on their site. Thirty of the 48 websites without a seal who were placing third party cookies (63 percent) disclosed the presence of third parties, for an overall third party cookie disclosure rate of 76 percent. In the U.K. websites were much less likely to allow third parties to use cookies to monitor customer behavior with only 50 percent of websites (28 out of 56)
allowing third parties to place cookies from their site (p<0.000). In the U.K., 27 out of 28 of these websites (96 percent) disclosed the presence of third party cookies on their site. This is comparable to the 97 percent disclosure rate of the sites with a web-seal in the U.S., and better than the average U.S. disclosure rate of 76 percent (p<0.01).
For the remaining items in Table 1 (more explanation about cookies, third party cookies, and especially how data is used for secondary purposes), the disclosure rates in the U.K. are all lower than the disclosure rates reported by JMS [2003] for U.S. websites (p<0.01). Overall, it is clear that the privacy disclosures of the U.K. websites are no better than the privacy disclosures in the U.S. The rates of non-compliance with the requirements of the U.K. law are substantial; and only the third party cookie disclosure rates (96 percent) indicate a high level of compliance.
While EU law appears not to improve disclosure of privacy practices, it does appear to reduce the use of cookies and third party cookies to track consumer behavior. This
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This raises an interesting question about the relationship between the standardization of accounting practices, and private demand for audit services.
In 
Research Method and Results For Choice/Consent Study
According to choice/consent, the second of the five OECD privacy principles, participants should be given an option to restrict the use of any personal information 7 AICPA and the Big Four accounting firms failed to penetrate the e-commerce privacy assurance market, which is currently dominated by TRUSTe and BBB Online. AICPA focused its online web-seal (WEBTRUST) on selling assurance with respect to business practices (internal control) and security, not privacy, and found that there is little demand for what they offered at the high prices they demanded. Likewise, DeWally and Ederington [2003] document a thriving market for quality assurance services for comic books sold on eBay. Although eBay designated PepBoys as its official assurance provider for used cars sold on its system, the demand for this service appears to be small. collected from them, especially for secondary uses unrelated to the processing of the transaction at hand. Websites use two primary options to let users control the use of their personal information. Opt-out, the most common option, allows users to explicitly restrict the website from transferring their data to any third party not involved directly in processing the transaction for which the data were collected. A second option is to require an explicit "opt-in" from the consumer, which expressly permits the website to use the data for secondary purposes such as internal and possibly external marketing. The opportunity to opt-out (or opt-in) is widely regarded as a key choice mechanism and U.K.
law requires that at least an opt-out option should be provided whenever personal data is collected. 8 The evidence gathered is summarized next.
We examined the effectiveness of the "opt-out" feature of websites by registering on the same 56 high-traffic websites used to test disclosure policies in Section 3 above.
We used the JMS [2003] procedure to monitor compliance of websites with privacy standards. We set up a private U.K. domain name, created 112 identities (name, U.K.
email address, U.K. based postal address, U.K. phone number with voice mail, and credit card number). These email accounts were secure in our private domain and could not be accessed by robots or telemarketers looking for public directories of email addresses.
Each of the 56 pairs of identities could be uniquely traced to one of the 56 websites where we used it for registration.
We registered twice on each of the 56 websites under two different identities.
Following the JMS [2003] procedure, we conducted one transaction (e.g., sent a greeting or email, or set up a portfolio) at the time of registration. We used the first set of 56 identities to register on each of the 56 websites and did not place any restriction on having our data shared with others, that is, we "opted-in" to receive messages and materials, such as magazines, relevant to our simulated identity. The second set of identities was used to register again on the same sites, where we "opted-out" immediately from having our information shared with both internal and any external parties. In the second registration we did not accept any free offers. Note that our registration procedure enabled us to uniquely identify the 112 sources (opt-in and opt-out registrations at 56 sites) of any incoming email because the name and email address used in each registration were different. All registrations were completed between September 2-8,
2002
.
Results: Choice/ Consent
We attempted to register on all 56 websites used in the disclosure part of the study. Of the 56 websites, 40 websites allowed us to opt-in, and only 25 websites allowed us to opt-out. Table 2 shows the weekly means (standard deviations) of the number of email messages received over the 26-week period following the registrations in the U.S. (as reported by JMS) and our data from the U.K. The top part of Figure 1 shows a chart of the weekly mean frequency of email messages from the U.S. opt-in (gray square), and the U.K. opt-in (black square). The two middle lines in Figure 1 show the U.S. opt-in excluding the highest volume website (gray triangle), and the U.K. opt-in excluding the highest volume website (black triangle). The bottom two lines in Figure 1 show the U.S. opt-out (gray circle), and the U.K. opt-out (black circle) website registrations in both the U.S. and the U.K. Most websites generated one confirmation message immediately following the registration.
opt-in and opt-out.
Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 About Here
JMS reported receiving few messages from opt-out registrations in the U.S.; the mean was only 0.45 messages per week. JMS also reported that most of the messages in the opt-out condition were generated by a handful of websites; one site generated 48 percent of all email messages and the top five sites accounted for 92 percent of all email received. Excluding these outliers, the mean number of weekly email messages was close to 0. In the present study of U.K. opt-out registrants, we received 468 commercial For opt-in registrants in the U.S., JMS reported receiving significantly more email with a mean of 8.44 emails per week. As in the opt-out condition, JMS reported that one 9 In the U.K. the top five sources of opt-out e-mail were from three retailers and two news organizations. In the U.S. the top five sources of opt-out e-mail were two retailers, a portal , a web hosting site and a financial site. It is often assumed that spam originates from disreputable adult sex and /or gambling websites. However, in our sample most spam originates from highly reputable websites. 10 We obtain the same pattern of results even if we eliminate only 3 outliers from the U.S. opt-out data F (1,61) = 0.18, p=0.6691.
outlier generated 56% of all the opt-in messages received. After excluding this outlier, the mean level of email was 3.81 per week in the U.S. (still significantly more than the mean level of email received by opt-out registrants at p<0.000). In the present study, the U.K. opt-in registrants received 9,563 email messages over the 26-week period of this study for an average of 9.20 messages per registration per week. This is 12 times the average volume of email messages received by the opt-out registrants. Paired sample ttest yields a mean difference of 8.45 (t = 14.74, 25 df, p <0.000). This result in the U.K.
of opt-in receiving more email than opt-out registrants is also consistent with the data reported by JMS [2003] for the U.S.
Beginning with an average of about 2 email messages per week in the first week (see Figure 1 , black square legend) the average level of email from U.K. websites rose steadily to about 14 per week in week 26. Like the opt-out results described earlier, the U.K. opt-in results were also driven in large part by a single website. Some 66 percent of all opt-in messages (a total of 6,342 messages over 26 weeks for an average of 244 per week) came from this single registration. Excluding the messages from this one outlier (black triangle legend), the email volume from the U.K. based opt-in sites gradually rises from about 2 per week to about 4.5 per week by the end of the 26-week period. This is more than 4 times the email volume for the opt-out registrants. Excluding the outlier data from the opt-in sample, the opt-in messages (mean of 3.18 email messages per week) continues to be significantly more than the opt-out messages (mean difference = 2.42, t=27.55, 25 df, p< 0.000). This pattern of results also replicates the U.S. data reported by JMS [2003] . There is no significant difference between the opt-in email level in the U.S. 
Implications For Financial Reporting
The U.K. (and the EU) chose to protect the privacy of their citizens by legislating standards to be monitored and enforced under the powers of government. The U.S., on the other hand, chose, through deliberation or default, to allow the privacy policies in ecommerce to evolve as norms or conventions of e-commerce without legislated standards or a punitive enforcement mechanism.
Our comparative study of the performance of these two regimes covers two dimensions of privacy. On the choice/consent dimension (i.e., participants controlling any secondary uses of their personal information) we find that the performance of the two regimes, as measured by the number of email messages sent to those who do and do not give consent to receive such messages, is almost identical. With only a few exceptions, most e-commerce sites honor the choice exercised by the registrants. Under both regimes, a few websites flood their registrants with commercial email messages, disregarding the latters' wishes. Registrants who indicate their willingness to receive commercial email messages receive a comparable level of message traffic under both regimes.
On the notice/awareness dimension (i.e., participants receiving timely notice of an entity's information and privacy policies), the overall performance of the standards and enforcement regime of the U.K. is about the same as that of the evolutionary regime of the U.S. In spite of the privacy law and enforcement mechanism, fewer U.K. websites post their privacy policies. It is more difficult to find the privacy policy statement on U.K. websites even when they are posted. These websites are less likely to disclose the use of cookies and how the data gathered is used for secondary internal, and external marketing purposes. In the U.K. there is less use of cookies, and less use of third party cookies to monitor activities of visitors to websites. This improvement in business practice (less monitoring) is offset by generally poorer disclosure of privacy practices, and slower development of an audit market to signal good privacy policies.
In the absence of legislated standards and their government enforcement, a market for web assurance services, including privacy assurance, has arisen in the U.S. About a third of the U.S. websites in the JMS [2003] sample chose to pay a small fee to the sellers of such services (e.g., TRUSTe and BBB Online) and had them certify that: (1) The website policies conformed to the privately developed standards of the assurance service provider, and (2) The website practices conformed to the website's stated policies. The U.S. websites that displayed the service providers' assurance seals performed at least as well as, and on average better than, the U.K. websites in protecting the privacy of their users. The legislation and enforcement mechanisms in the U.K. and the EU were set up on the assumption that they will help improve privacy on the Internet. Our comparative study of the U.K. and the U.S. reveals that privacy has fared no better in the U.K. than in the unregulated U.S. environment. How could we explain this apparent disparity?
Statutory Law and Social Conventions
Codified standards with formal enforcement are concrete and salient. Extant standards are published, easily disseminated, specified formally with some precision, and can be analyzed and discussed. 12 They come into existence at a specific time, through a site, and one news site. Spam originates from a variety of legitimate and highly reputable sites. 12 See Fuller [1964] and Dworkin [1986] for discussion of natural law theory.
known and understood institutional process that may allow the participation of the constituents. When the environment changes, or the standards are no longer perceived to induce the desired patterns of behavior, there is a systematic process available to formulate changes and submit them to a well-specified process for possible promulgation.
A transparent institutional mechanism for setting and modifying standards holds a natural appeal in a democratic polity. Following accidents and scandals, "the rules were not clear" is a popular defense for scoundrels and managers who have not adopted good data handling practices. Codification of standards-let us make the rules clear to all-is a frequently chosen response to calm the political waters. Formal written standards also appeal to our sense of good housekeeping.
Social conventions and norms are less well defined, vary in time and space, and require an extended socialization process to learn and understand (Coleman [1990] ).
Conventions carry a penumbra of uncertainty about the edges; there is substantial but incomplete overlap among the beliefs of the individual members of a group about its norms. Even with a unique definition in time or place, norms evolve in small, almost imperceptible steps by processes that are not well understood. The evolution of norms is decentralized in the extreme, and even experts find it difficult to predict their direction.
While the evolutionary process is not opaque, the lack of definition and our lesser understanding of how norms develop and evolve make them less transparent. When a scandal occurs, existing institutions face a legitimacy crisis, since the scandal itself mocks the claims of expertise and efficiency required to legitimize existing institutions.
It is hardly surprising, then, that during periods of crises, political or bureaucratic
Standards and Norms, 12/2/03 decision makers feel pressure to write new standards rather than continue to rely on existing (recently discredited) norms and business practices.
Formal standards require formal enforcement mechanisms to be effective.
Government departments, courts and regulatory agencies, industry associations and private sector organizations in national and international domains monitor the implementation of various kinds of standards, and furnish procedures to impose penalties on violators. Formal enforcement of informal social conventions is difficult. However, social relationships among business participants make it possible to create a "word-ofmouth" mechanism where feedback and reputation can be enhanced (or damaged) rapidly and a sense of community can be formed among interested parties. New Internet technologies make it possible for people to significantly expand these social networks (Dellarocas [2003] ).
As we have seen from the data presented in this paper from two jurisdictions, the opt-out regime works well and almost identically in both. Exercising the opt-out option enables users to avoid virtually all the junk email. 13 A few sites promise, but fail to honor the opt-out provision. Formal regulation coupled with government enforcement appears to have little effect on the average behavior of websites. Moreover, formal regulation does not appear to provide protection from the extreme behavior of a few websites. This is consistent with what we observe in financial reporting: Enron, WorldCom, and other companies were mired in accounting scandals in the most extensively regulated financial reporting environment in the world. 13 Note that registration and transactions at e-commerce sites are not the only source of email addresses for bulk junk mailers. Email address lists for spammers are compiled from many other sources, such as websites which list personal addresses, and from legitimate email.
With all its apparent advantages of clarity, explicitness, and the power of enforcement, the standards approach also suffers from several disadvantages relative to the evolutionary or social convention approach to regulation. In the following section we examine these issues in the context of financial reporting, although much of what we have to say is applicable to other fields.
Standards vs. General Acceptance in Financial Reporting
When the U.S. Congress created the SEC, and gave it the legal authority to regulate financial reporting in 1933-34, financial reporting practice was governed largely by convention. The first three decades of regulation were devoted largely to codifying these conventions into GAAP. These seven decades have seen a gradual, but inexorable, shift from convention or a social norm approach to legally enforceable standards. The shift is also reflected in the increasingly assertive nomenclature of the three private sector organizations entrusted with the task of writing accounting rules and their publications:
The Committee on Accounting Procedure's Accounting Research Bulletins (1948-59) , the Accounting Principles Board's Opinions , and the FASB's Financial Accounting Standards (1973 to present) .
By the turn of the century, the social norm or convention approach of the earlier years hardly has any advocates. The U.S., followed by much of the rest of the world, now favors a more formal legislated standards (with legal enforcement) model for financial
reporting. Yet, the evidence that formal standards do any better than social norms of financial reporting remains elusive. To the extent the empirical evidence reported in this study on e-commerce privacy is relevant to financial reporting, the case for the efficacy of enforced standards remains to be made. If we accept Thoreau's motto -that
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14 Regulation is often proposed as a solution in case of market failure. Regulation, too, is subject to failure (see Djankov [2003] ). In the following paragraphs, we consider four possible reasons why formal legal standards and state enforcement, with their apparent advantages, may not necessarily dominate social norms in financial reporting.
We label them as the information, design, gaming and signaling problems.
The Information Problem
The most difficult problem any rule maker faces is the identification of a good Unfortunately, these parties have little incentives to report truthfully, and their strategic responses only muddy the waters (see Sunder [1997] , Chapter 11, and Sunder [2003] ), and create the gaming problem discussed below, often forcing the rule maker to deal with unintended consequences of the rules.
In social conventions, as in biology, evolution proceeds in fits and starts, with little guarantee of progress. Each small or large change in conventions is induced by and induces changes in individual behavior, moving the social system to a new, albeit temporary, expectations equilibrium (see ). People get the chance to experience the consequences of each change, and adjust their behavior to the new circumstances. Information in possession of the individuals that rule makers cannot capture for their decision-making gets aggregated into these outcomes through market and other social processes (see Hayek [1945] ). For this reason the evolved social norms often incorporate more information than the rules made by legislature, boards, and other corporate entities.
The Design Problem
The corporate entities for setting standards need a structure, people, and resources. All three force compromises in the design of the entity. Legislative structures emphasize representativeness, judicial structures emphasize impartiality, while bureaucratic structures value rules of procedure above all. It is not possible to attain perfect representativeness, impartiality, and consistency of procedure all at once. Finding the people to operate the rule-making system runs into parallel problems. The best experts may not be representative or impartial, and they may be inclined to use their judgment instead of following pre-defined procedures. Representative bodies may lack expertise in the substance of the matter, and do not place impartiality high on their agenda, and so on. Finally, those who pay for the cost of developing standards seek to
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The Gaming Problem
The difficulty posed by the information problem discussed above is compounded by the dynamics between rules and the behavior the rules are intended to influence. Each For example, Tan and Jamal [2003] found that reducing discretion in accounting rules has an unintended effect of changing the "real" operating decisions of managers. Any adjustment of the rules to such outcomes sets up yet another cycle of adjustments and changes. Individuals can adjust faster than the rule makers can. It is difficult to make sure that this action-reaction sequence converges to a rule and pattern of behavior, which are in equilibrium with each other. Informality and the flexibility of social norms have a better chance of effectively dealing with this gaming problem through evolution stretched over a long period of time.
The Signaling Problem
A formal standards approach to financial reporting favors narrowing the range of options available to the reporting entity. Many believe that a narrower set of choices Standards and Norms, 12/2/03 available to the accounting entity in how to report a given event or transaction promotes comparability and consistency, and enhances the value of financial statements. Valid as this argument might be, it also ignores the signaling value of the choices made by the reporting entity. In making a choice from a given set of alternatives, the entity cannot help but reveal information it holds privately about its preferences and expectations.
Managers of the entity reveal their privately held information, in part, through the financial reporting methods they choose (Levine [1996] ). The use of aggressive reporting methods gives valuable information to careful readers of the financial reports. Narrowing financial reporting choices through strict standards also eliminates the ability of managers to transmit information through their choice of financial reporting methods.
Conclusion
One consequence of a legislated approach to setting e-commerce privacy standards appears to be the stifling of a market for private web assurance. Since the law in the U.K. specifies privacy disclosure requirements, and there is no legal requirement to purchase a privacy audit certificate, there is hardly a market for privacy assurance seals.
The privacy disclosure law appears to have eliminated the incentives for the websites to use web-seals as signals of their good privacy practices to consumers.
In financial reporting, the legal requirement of independent audit of publicly held firms seems to serve as an obstacle to the efficient functioning of a market for audit services. If independent audit were not a legal requirement, firms with sufficient confidence in their accounts and in their prospects would spend the money to hire reputable independent auditors to convince their shareholders about their transparency and good prospects. Firms without such confidence will not find it worthwhile to hire Standards and Norms, 12/2/03 auditors. Investors, presented with reports with and without auditor certificates will have to make their own risk assessments and price the securities accordingly. Without government regulation, a market for certification or audit services would develop analogous to the U.S. market for web services in e-commerce. JMS [2003] adduce evidence of a web certification market for privacy assurance, and DeWally and Ederington [2003] analyze the evolution and functioning of an audit certification service for online comic book auctions on eBay. Instead of allowing such a market to develop, the SEC requires all firms to have their reports audited, and tries to specify the standards by which the auditing must be carried out. The extensive regulation of audit practice has been accompanied by commoditization of the audit, and the widespread auditing scandals of recent years.
In the absence of mandated standards, U.S. websites tend to view the disclosure of privacy policies as an instrument of their marketing strategy to attract consumers. Accordingly, they make it easy to find their statements of policy, and adhere to these policies reasonably closely. U.K. websites, on the other hand, appear to view privacy disclosure as merely a compliance matter; they appear to be, at the very least, indifferent to consumer concerns about their privacy policies, and on average, make it more difficult than in U.S. for their customers to find their statements of policy.
Proponents of government regulation of e-commerce privacy are thus likely to be disappointed after passage of a privacy law. At best, a privacy law may evolve through iterations to keep up with changing technology used to encroach upon consumer privacy.
At worst, a privacy law may provide false comfort to consumers, and actually impair Third, the final chapter of Internet privacy practices and regulation has not yet been written. We cannot rule out the possibility that the U.S. may follow the legal approach of the EU in the future, or that the EU may abandon its law. Even if legislation is passed in the US, our results suggest that the problem of spam or pop up ads may not be solved. It may well be that the law will have to evolve to plug the loopholes exploited 15 It is tempting to hypothesize that sex and gambling sites, being less reputable, will have less regard for their customer's privacy. On the other hand, customers of such sites may be more sensitive about protecting their privacy, giving the site owners better incentives to protect the privacy of their customers. A separate field study of such sites, and "boiler room operations" would be needed to address this question.
by spammers through ever-evolving technology. 16 Demands for amendments in, and better enforcement of, the privacy law in the U.K. have already appeared. Given the rapid change in electronic technology, it is likely that any law passed in the U.S. would evolve through much iteration before it satisfactorily enhances the privacy of consumers. It may be faster and less error prone for informal norms to evolve in response to the changing behavior of corporate management. There isn't enough evidence yet about the relative abilities of law and social norms to respond efficiently to environmental changes. We cannot yet make definitive judgments about whether law must displace informal norms for a market to succeed. We believe it is more likely that both jurisdictions will settle on some combination of the two approaches that relies partially on regulation as well as evolved norms.
Finally, there are many differences between the U.K. and the U.S., and between ecommerce privacy and financial reporting which require us to exercise caution in making analogies from one jurisdiction to another (Healy [2003] ). Our study is not a perfect controlled experiment, so an inferential judgment must be made across these jurisdictional differences. Recent research in banking (Barth et al. [2003] ), and securities regulation (Romano [2002] and Laporta et al. [2003] ) examines the possibility of regulatory failures, especially when public as opposed to private enforcement is the primary instrument of regulation.
Recent months have seen a revival of the old debate on the degree to which financial reporting should rely on detailed rules versus broad principles of accounting.
Any shift in emphasis between rules and principles implies a corresponding change in 16 Hansell (2003) reliance on formal enforcement and norms of behavior. The consensus seems to be shifting towards placing more weight on principles. The findings of the present study that raise questions about the effectiveness of enforced law in enhancing e-commerce privacy can be usefully considered in this light.
Law, auditors, reputation, business norms and practices, warranties, disclosure, and industry associations are competing trust creation mechanisms associated with markets. The value of each mechanism depends on which other mechanisms are available in a particular market. While each mechanism may be useful in isolation, the marginal value of some over others may be small. A large body of literature in psychology (Cook [2001] ), sociology (Granovetter [1985] ) and political science (Putnam [1993] In a field experiment, Jamal, Maier and Sunder (JMS [2003] ) programmed a web crawler to repeatedly visit 100 selected high traffic websites in the U.S. during the week of July [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] 2001 , and to record what cookies (and third party cookies) are used by these websites to monitor visitors to the websites. JMS then download the privacy policies of these 100 websites and record the number of websites who disclose their use of cookies (and third party cookies), as well as disclosures on how data collected from participants is used and shared internally and with external third parties. U.S. websites are classified into two groups: those that purchase an independent web assurance seal (n=34), and those who do not have a web-seal (n=66). We applied the JMS procedure during the period of May 27 -June 12, 2002 for 56 high traffic U.K. websites which are governed by EU privacy law. A U.K. government body monitors and enforces the privacy law in the U.K. None of the U.K. websites had a web-seal.
Standards and Norms, 12/2/03 In a field experiment, Jamal, Maier and Sunder (JMS [2003] ) constructed 200 identities (name, address, email address) and attempt to register twice on each of 100 high traffic websites in the U.S. In the opt-in registrations (n=69), JMS allow the website to use their personal data for both internal marketing purposes, and to sell personal data to external third parties. In the opt-out registrations (n=43), JMS do not allow the website to use their data for any secondary purpose. We applied the JMS field experiment methodology to 56 high traffic websites in the U.K. Out of the 56 websites, 40 U.K. websites allowed us to opt-in, and 25 websites allowed us to opt-out. In a field experiment, Jamal, Maier and Sunder (JMS [2003] ) constructed 200 identities (name, address, email address) and attempted to register twice on each of 100 high traffic websites in the U.S. In the opt-in registrations (n=69), JMS allowed the website to use personal data for both internal marketing purposes, and to sell personal data to external third parties. In the opt-out registrations (n=43), JMS did not allow the website to use personal data for any secondary purpose. JMS tracked the number of email messages received at each registered address over the twenty-six week period following the registration. We applied the JMS procedure on 56 U.K. websites regulated by EU privacy law. From our 56 websites in the U.K., 40 websites allowed an opt-in, and 25 websites allowed us to opt-out. Raw data for this chart are shown in Table 2 . Figure 1 shows the average number of messages received by all U.S. and U.K. opt-in sites, average number of messages for all U.S. and U.K. opt-in sites except one outlier removed from both the U.S. and the U.K, and the average number of messages received from all U.S. and U.K. opt-out sites.
Standards and Norms, 12/2/03 In a field experiment, Jamal, Maier and Sunder (JMS [2003] ) constructed 100 identities (name, address, email address) and attempted to register on each of 100 high traffic websites in the U.S. In the opt-in registrations JMS allowed the website to use their personal data for both internal marketing purposes, and to sell data to external third parties. Sixty-nine websites allowed JMS to register and opt-in. JMS tracked the number of email messages received in each registered address over a 26-week period. We replicate the JMS procedure in the U.K. for 56 high traffic websites. Forty of these websites allowed us to opt-in. We chart the number of email messages received at each of our opt-in and opt-out addresses.
In the U.S., one site alone, (an outlier), generated 56 percent of all opt-in messages indicated by the first circle on the chart. The five highest volume sites generated 80 percent of the total opt-in messages. In the U.K. (light square symbol in the figure), one site generated approximately 63 percent of all messages. The five highest volume sites generated 83 percent of the total opt-out messages. Note that the vertical scale has been truncated at 50 percent in order to highlight the differences in the 90-100 percent range.
Standards and Norms, 12/2/03 In a field experiment, Jamal, Maier and Sunder (JMS [2003] ) constructed 100 identities (name, address, email address) and attempted to register twice on each of 100 high traffic websites in the U.S. In the opt-out registrations JMS did not allow the website to use data for any secondary purpose. Out of the 100 websites, 43 allowed JMS to register and opt-out. JMS tracked the number of email messages received in each registered address over a 26-week period. We replicate the JMS procedure in the U.K. for 56 high traffic websites. Twenty-five U.K. websites allowed us to opt-out. We chart the number of email messages received at each of our opt-in and opt-out addresses. In the U.S., one site alone, (dark circle), generated 62 percent of all opt-out messages indicated by the first circle on the chart. The five highest volume sites generated 91 percent of the total opt-out messages. In the U.K. (light square symbol in the figure), one site generated approximately 93 percent of all messages. The five highest volume sites generated 97 percent of the total opt-out messages. Note that the vertical scale has been truncated at 50 percent in order to highlight the differences in the 90-100 percent range.
